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THE CRANE CONTROVERSY CONTINUES
Tufts v. Commissioner
651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983)
ANGELA PRENDERGAST, 1982*
The Supreme Court holding in Crane v. Commissioner' is the
source of a controversy which remains unresolved despite 35 years of
commentary and judicial analysis. Tufts v. Commissioner2 is the latest
addition to the extensive body of legal writing aimed at clarifying the
rationale and scope of the Crane holding. Although Crane is the foun-
dation for tax law governing many real property transactions, including
many tax shelters, 3 until Tufts no court allowed the taxpayer to benefit
from the plain language of Crane's footnote 37. Tufts is, therefore, an
important decision which, if allowed to stand, indicates a dramatic re-
versal of the conservative interpretations given Crane.
In Crane, the Court held that the amount of a nonrecourse mort-
gage securing property is included in the basis of that property and
that, upon disposition of the property, the entire remaining balance of
the mortgage must be included in the taxpayer's amount realized. 4 The
use of nonrecourse financing, a method of financing whereby a loan of
money is secured only by a certain piece of property, is advantageous
because it reduces the economic risk of investment.5 Crane's inclusion
of a nonrecourse loan in the basis6 of the property further benefits the
* B.S. Quincy College, J.D., 1982, lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See infra text accompanying notes 23-44.
2. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
3. The Crane doctrine has been the foundation of many tax shelters. See Bittker, Tax Shel-
ters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane case, 33 TAX L. REV. 277, 283 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Bittker]; McGuire, Negative Capital Accounts and the Failing Tax Shelter, 3 J. OF REAL EST. TAX
439 (1976) [hereinafter cited as McGuire].
4. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. Nonrecourse loans, once rarely used, are not uncommon today. They are often used in
partnerships. A common example of a nonrecourse loan is where the note specifically states that
the lender will look only to the property securing the loan and that no mortgagor has any personal
liability. Another example is a purchase money mortgage in a state where law provided that no
deficiency judgment may be obtained against the buyer on such a mortgage. See A. WILLIS, J.
DENNELL, P. POSTELWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, § 43.04 (3d ed. 1982).
6. I.R.C. § 1012 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
The basis of property shall be the cost of such property. ...
Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (1960) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In general, the basis of property is the cost thereof. The cost is the amount paid for
such property in cash or other property.
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taxpayer in two ways. First, losses can be deducted only to the extent
of the basis. Including in the basis the amount of nonrecourse liability
secured by the property increases the basis of that property and, there-
fore, increases the total amount of deductions that can be taken.7 Sec-
ond, the amount of gain upon the sale or other disposition of the
property, which amount is subject to taxation, is the excess of the
amount realized over the basis.8 Thus, a larger basis benefits the tax-
payer because it results in a smaller taxable gain.
The Crane Court's inclusion of nonrecourse liability in the basis
conferred yet another benefit upon subsequent taxpayers. Because de-
preciation deductions are calculated using the basis which, after Crane,
included nonrecourse mortgages, the taxpayer was able to take deduc-
tions without incurring personal liability. The seeming imbalance of
this rule was, however, tempered by its corollary; having benefited
from the larger depreciation deductions made possible by the inclusion
of the nonrecourse loan amount in the basis, the taxpayer must include
the loan amount in the amount realized 9 upon the disposition of the
property securing the debt.' 0
The facial equity of this pattern has recently been disturbed. Rely-
ing on a footnote in Crane, in Tufts v. Commissioner," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized an exception to
the general rule of inclusion. In Tufts, because the fair market value of
property secured by a nonrecourse mortgage had declined, upon dispo-
sition of the property, the taxpayer received less than the amount of the
mortgage. The Fifth Circuit refused to include the entire amount of
the nonrecourse mortgage in the amount realized even though the tax-
payer had taken depreciation deductions using a basis which included
the nonrecourse mortgage. The court held that the portion of a nonre-
course mortgage that must be included in the amount realized upon
disposition of the property securing the mortgage is limited to the fair
7. "Deduction" is a general term for an amount that is subtracted from gross income to
arrive at taxable income. See CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 80 (2d ed. 1973).
8. I.R.C. § 1001 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Computation of gain or loss.-The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall
be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section
1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in
such section for determining the loss over the amount realized.
(b) Amount Realized.-The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall
be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than
money) received.
9. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1976). See supra note 8.
10. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1947).
11. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 1026 (1983).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
market value of the property.' 2 The Tufts holding is in direct conflict
with the earlier Third Circuit holding in Millar v. Commissioner.13 The
Millar court, under similar facts, included the full amount of a nonre-
course mortgage in the amount realized.
In today's world of highly leveraged real estate tax shelters and
mortgaged properties which have declined in value, the importance of
a clear understanding of the tax consequences of the disposition of such
properties cannot be underestimated. This comment will show that
Tufts has added to the confusion surrounding this area and will illus-
trate the necessity for action by the Supreme Court to determine the
exact state of the law. This comment will first analyze the Supreme
Court's decision in Crane. The rationale of Millar and Tufts will then
be examined. Finally, the impact of these decisions will be discussed.
DEFINITIONS
The basis of property is defined as its cost.' 4 The basis includes
indebtedness, whether recourse15 or nonrecourse, incurred with respect
to the property.16 Basis is adjusted for depreciation taken.
The amount realized on the sale or other disposition of the prop-
erty is the sum of "any money received plus the fair market value of
any property received."' 7 When a taxpayer sells property and is re-
lieved of the liability of a mortgage, the amount of the liability is in-
cluded in the amount realized.' 8 The amount of gain from the sale or
other disposition of property equals the excess of the amount realized
over the adjusted basis.' 9 There is no gain to the extent of the adjusted
12. Id at 1063.
13. Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1979).
14. I.R.C. § 1012 (1976). See supra note 6.
15. Recourse indebtedness is a personal liability of the debtor. See Del Cotto, Basis and
Amount Realized under Crane.- A Current View ofSome Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 69, 71 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Del Cotto].
16. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See Rollyson, Service Turns the Tables on the
Crane Doctrine, 3 J. OF REAL EST. TAx. 495, 496 (1976).
17. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1976). See supra note 8.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2a(4)(1) (1960). See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I (1947);
Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 214-15 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1979);
Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1965). But see Tufts v. Commissioner,
651 F.2d 1058, 1063 (5th Cir. 198 1),rev'g 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983) (amount
realized did not include the full amount of a nonrecourse mortgage where the amount of the
mortgage exceeded the fair market value of the property.)
19. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1976). See supra note 8. For the general method of computing gain or
loss through the sale or other disposition of property see I.R.C. § 1001 (a) through (d) (1976).
These sections provide that the amount of the adjusted basis prescribed by I.R.C. § 1011 and the
regulation thereunder shall be returned to the taxpayer by subtracting such amount from the
amount realized. The excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis constitutes the real-
ized gain. If the amount of the adjusted basis is greater than the amount realized, as loss is
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basis20 because the basis represents the taxpayer's cost of the property
and is, therefore, considered a return of capital, not profit.
Despite these well-settled principles, the rules governing the deter-
mination of the amount realized are in question when nonrecourse lia-
bility is greater than the value of the property. Specifically, the
question whether relief from a nonrecourse liability can be viewed as
an amount realized to the extent it exceeds the fair market value of the
property remains unsettled.
21
THE RATIONALE OF CRANE V COMMISSIONER
In the landmark case Crane v. Commissioner,22 the Supreme Court
for the first time ruled upon the includability in basis and treatment
upon disposition of a nonrecourse loan securing depreciable property.
23
The Court held that the basis of property subject to a mortgage in-
cludes the amount of the mortgage, whether the mortgage is recourse or
nonrecourse, and that when such property is sold the "amount real-
ized" includes the entire remaining balance of that mortgage. 24 The
taxpayer in Crane inherited an apartment building which was subject
to a nonrecourse mortgage of $255,000.25 During the seven years she
sustained to the extent of the difference between such adjusted basis and the amount realized. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (1960). Following is an example of the computation of gain:
In Year I, X purchases an asset for $10,000 paying $1,500 in cash and signing a note for
$8,500. X takes depreciation deductions in Year I and Year 2 totalling $3,500 and also reduces
the amount outstanding on the note to $7,100. X sells the asset in Year 3. The buyer pays $1,200
in cash and assumes liability on the note. X's amount realized is $8,300. ($1,200 + $7,100). Since
X's adjusted basis is $6,500 ($10,000 - $3,500), X's gain to the taxpayer is the same whether the
note is recourse or nonrecourse.
20. See I.R.C. § 1011 (1976).
21. This issue has been the subject of much litigation. See, e.g., Tufts v. Commissioner, 651
F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'g 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983) (amount realized
limited to the fair market value of the property); Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978) (amount realized not limited by the fair market value of
the property); Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979) (partners realized gain from
repossession of equipment was not limited by the fair market value of the equipment); Collins v.
Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1963) (the amount realized on the cancellation of a nonre-
course note could not exceed the value of the property securing the note). See also, Rev. Rul. 76-
Ill, 1976-1 C.B. 214 (where mortgagor transfers property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage to
the mortgagee in satisfaction of the mortgage, the amount realized will equal the outstanding
balance of the mortgage, even if this amount exceeds the fair market value of the property).
22. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). For a full discussion of Crane, see Adams, Exploring the Outer Bound-
aries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REv. 159 (1966);
Bittker, supra note 3; McGuire, supra note 3.
23. Note, Tax Consequences of the Disposition of Property Subject to an Unassumed Mort-
gage, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 845, 846 (1949).
24. See Perry, Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX L.
Rav. 525 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Perry].
25. At the time of decedent's death, Jan. 11, 1932, the apartment building was subject to a
mortgage on which there was due $255,000 principal and $7,042.50 accrued interest, a total of
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held and operated the property,26 depreciation deductions were calcu-
lated using a basis which included the full amount of the nonrecourse
mortgage. When the building was sold, the taxpayer received $3,000 in
cash. After deducting $500 in expenses the taxpayer reported a net
gain of $2,500 of which $1,250 was taxable gain.27 The Commissioner,
however, determined that the taxpayer realized a gain of $23,767 and
assessed a deficiency.
28
The taxpayer adopted a common-sense position, arguing that be-
cause the building was subject to a mortgage, the "property" she inher-
ited was not the physical building itself, but only the equity in the
building, or, the excess of the fair market value over the mortgage.
Since at the time she inherited the building its value equaled the
amount of the mortgage,29 her equity was zero. The basis of property
acquired by devise is the fair market value of such property at the time
of acquisition. 30  If the "property" she inherited was only the equity,
then her basis was zero. As neither she nor the buyer had ever assumed
the mortgage, 3' it could be disregarded. Thus, the taxpayer concluded
that her gain on the sale, net cash received less the basis, was $2,500.32
The Supreme Court rejected the taxpayer's contentions. The Court
reasoned that the correct statutory construction of the term "property"
is the ordinary, everyday meaning-the land and buildings them-
selves-not equity, as the taxpayer claimed. Therefore, the taxpayer's
basis in the property was its fair market value, $262,042.50. 33
The Court next addressed the problem of determining the amount
$262,042.50. Crane v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 585, 586 (1944), rev'd, 153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1943),
aff'd 331 U.S. 1 (1946).
26. On Feb. 1, 1932, and until the property was sold and conveyed on Nov. 29, 1938, the
mortgage was in default for nonpayment of interest. In 1932 the taxpayer and the bank holding
the mortgage entered into an agreement whereby the taxpayer would operate the apartment build-
ing, reserve certain specified amounts for expenses, and remit the excess to the bank to be applied
toward the mortgage. The taxpayer never assumed the mortgage. Id
27. 331 U.S. at 3-4. The taxpayer assumed the entire property was a capital asset. According
to §§ 117(a), (b) of the Revenue Act of 1938, only 50% of the gain on the sale of a capital asset
held for more than 2 years was taxable. Thus, cash received ($3,000) less expenses ($500) equals
net gain ($2,500). Net gain ($2,500) x 50% = taxable gain ($1,250). Id at 4, n.3.
28. 331 U.S. at 4. The Tax Court held that the only amount realized by the taxpayer was
$2,500 and expunged the deficiency. 3 T.C. 591. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, holding that the amount realized by the taxpayer included the full value of the building.
153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1945). The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 328 U.S. 826 (1945).
29. On Jan. 11, 1932, the property was appraised for federal estate tax purposes at a value of
$262,042.50, and the amount due on the mortgage was determined to be the same amount. 3 T.C.
at 586.
30. I.R.C. § 1014 (1976) provides that the basis of property acquired from a decedent is the
fair market value of the property as of the date of decedent's death.
31. 3 T.C. at 587.
32. See supra note 27.
33. 331 U.S. at II.
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realized by the taxpayer upon the disposition of the property. The
Court used two theories to justify inclusion of the full amount of the
taxpayer's nonrecourse mortgage in the amount realized: the economic
benefit theory and the tax benefit theory.
34
The Economic Benefit Theory
The economic benefit theory is based on the presumption that for-
giveness of a recourse debt, a personal liability, results in an economic
benefit to the debtor. 35 There is no requirement that money or prop-
erty be received in order to realize an economic benefit. 36 The Crane
Court explained that a purchaser who either pays or assumes a seller's
mortgage as part of the transaction confers upon the seller a benefit as
real and substantial as if money had been paid to the seller and then
paid over to the creditor 37 because when the purchaser pays or assumes
a mortgage for which the seller is personally liable, the seller is relieved
of his obligation to pay. The economic benefit is measured by the
amount of the liability forgiven and this amount is then included in the
amount realized upon disposition of the property.
The Crane Court extended this principle to include a seller who is
not personally liable on the mortgage encumbering his property. At
first consideration it would appear that such a seller would reap no
benefit from having the buyer either assume his nonrecourse mortgage
or pay it because he is not personally liable on the debt. There is no
benefit in relief from a debt he does not "owe." The Crane Court, how-
ever, compared the owner whose mortgage is a personal liability to the
nonrecourse mortgagor whose property is mortgaged at an amount
equal to or less than the fair market value and found that each must
treat the conditions of their mortgage the same way in order to retain
their property; each must pay the mortgage or forfeit the property.
Therefore, the Court reasoned that each must accrue the same benefit
upon relief from the debt.38 The Court concluded that, like the mort-
gagor whose debt is a personal liability, upon disposition of the prop-
erty securing the mortgage the nonrecourse mortgagor receives an
34. For a full discussion of these two theories see generally Note, Millar: Requiem for Crane's
Footnote 37, 41 U. Pirr. L. REV. 343 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Requiem).
35. Requiem, supra note 34, at 348.
36. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938); Haass v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A.
948, 955 (1938); Brons Hotels, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 376, 390 (1936).
37. 331 U.S. at 13. See Lutz v. Schramm Co., I T.C. 682 (1943).
38. 331 U.S. at 14. See Del Cotto, supra note 15 at 75. See also Mayerson v. Commissioner,
47 T.C. 340, 351-52 (1966) (Tax Court untroubled by lack of personal liability).
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economic benefit in the amount of the mortgage and such amount must
be included in the amount realized from the transaction.
The taxpayer in Crane owned property subject to a nonrecourse
mortgage. Had she chosen not to pay the mortgage she would have lost
the property. In that the result of nonpayment would have been the
same if she were personally liable on the mortgage, the Court treated
the assumption of the mortgage by the buyer as if the taxpayer was
being released from liability on the mortgage. The Court found that
upon disposition of the property and assumption of the mortgage by
the buyer the taxpayer received an economic benefit equal'to the entire
amount of the mortgage plus cash received, even though she was never
personally liable on that mortgage.
The Court did, however, acknowledge that such might not always
be the result. In Chief Justice Vinson's now famous 39 "footnote 37," he
stated:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the
mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a
benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem
might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or
transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is
not this case.4o
The Court suggested that upon disposition of property subject to a non-
recourse mortgage an economic benefit accrues to the seller only inso-
far as the sales price exceeds the mortgage amount. If the market price
of mortgaged property drops below the amount of the mortgage, the
mortgagor who is personally liable on the mortgage bears the full loss
because the entire amount of the mortgage is still collectible. If the
mortgage is nonrecourse, however, the most the mortgagor can lose is
the fair market value of the property because taking over the property
is the only way such a debt can be satisfied, if it is in default. There-
fore, since the loss would be limited, the Court, in its footnote, sug-
gested a limit to the economic benefit that could be realized upon
forgiveness of a nonrecourse debt. That limit is the fair market value
of the property.
The Tax Benefit Theory
The Crane Court also relied upon the tax benefit theory which
39. Footnote 37 has been called the "most famous footnote in tax history." Bittker, supra
note 3, at 277.
40. 331 U.S. at 14, n.37. "Boot" is a term used to describe "other property" received in an
exchange which, but for such other property, would be nontaxable. See, e.g., J. MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, §§ 20, 29 (lst ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
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provides that if a deduction taken in a prior year is recovered in a later
year, the amount recovered should be included in gross income in the
later year.4' Under the tax benefit theory the government can collect or
"reclaim" the amount of a deduction taken if it later turns out that the
deduction was unwarranted, or, instead of paying back an unwarranted
deduction, some sort of later inclusion can be compelled to justify the
deduction. 42 In Crane the taxpayer included the amount of a nonre-
course loan in her basis for depreciation purposes but failed to include
the amount of the loan in the amount realized upon disposition of the
property. The Court viewed this as taking a "double deduction," the
first, when depreciation deductions were claimed, the second, when no
accounting was made for those deductions upon disposition of the
property.43  To prevent such a double deduction from occurring the
Court compelled the inclusion of the mortgage amount in the amount
realized on the sale.
44
The Crane Court concluded that the "property" inherited by the
taxpayer was the apartment building itself and that the amount of the
nonrecourse loan secured by the property was includable in the tax-
payer's basis. The Court further held that, on these facts, the entire
amount of the nonrecourse mortgage must be included in the amount
realized upon disposition of the property.
41. See generally J. MERTENS, supra note 40 at § 7.34. The rule is of judicial origin and has
been codified in various parts of the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 111 (1976) which
provides that when a prior deduction for bad debts, prior tax, or delinquency amounts resulted in
an income tax benefit, then to the extent of the benefit, the recovery of these amounts in a later
year must be included in gross income. I.R.C. §§ 1245 and 1250 (1976) provide for the recapture
of depreciation deductions under similar circumstances.
"The tax benefit rule is both a rule of inclusion and exclusion: recovery of an item previously
deducted must be included in income; that portion of the recovery not resulting in a prior tax
benefit is excluded. The rule in both aspects evolved judicially and administratively." Putoma
Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652, 664 n.10 (1976), aff'd, 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis
in original).
42. See, e.g., First Trust and Savings Bank of Taylorville v. United States, 614 F.2d 1142 (7th
Cir. 1980) (bank realized income when personal property taxes paid and deducted from income
for federal income tax purposes in 1972 were refunded in 1973); Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v.
United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (deductions taken by a taxpayer for a charitable contri-
bution based on conveyance of realty were classified as income upon recoupment of the property
where the taxpayer had obtained tax benefits from such deductions); Union Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, Ill F.2d 60 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940) (refunds of previously de-
ducted taxes are to be treated as income in the year received). See also, Requiem, supra note 34, at
347 and authorities cited therein.
43. 331 U.S. at 15-16.
44. Requiem, supra note 34, at 347.
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CRANE'S PROGENY
The Crane doctrine45 became firmly established in the body of tax
law and has continued to be the rule governing many transactions.
46
Crane was first extended to nonrecourse mortgage liens on property
acquired by purchase where the full value of unassumed tax liens was
held includable in the taxpayer's depreciable basis.47 In another case,
the absence of personal liability for a purchase-money mortgage did
not preclude the inclusion of the amount of the mortgage in the depre-
ciable basis of the property where the total circumstances of the trans-
action persuaded the court that the ultimate effect of the taxpayer's
nonrecourse liability would be the same if he were personally liable on
the debt.48 Where a corporation acquired title in property, secured
financing, executed leases and then transferred the property to individ-
uals, subject to the mortgage and leases but without personal liability,
the court found that the individuals acquired a depreciable interest in
the properties. 49 The unpaid balance of the mortgage at the time of
such transfer was, therefore, includable in basis for the purpose of de-
preciation.50 Thus, the rule that bona fide nonrecourse debt is includ-
able in basis is not in dispute.5
Similarly, Crane's rule including nonrecourse debt in the amount
45. The Crane holding called for inclusion in basis and amount realized upon disposition of
the property of the amount of any mortgage secured by the property, regardless of whether the
mortgage is recourse or nonrecourse. 331 U.S. at 15-16.
46. For a discussion of cases decided after Crane and the status of the Crane rule today, see
Weiss, The Crane Case Updated, 32 THE TAX LAW. 289 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Weiss].
47. Blackstone Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801, 804-05 (1949). The court held that
the full value of unassumed tax liens was includable in the purchaser's depreciable basis even
though there was no personal liability as to the liens and the liens were settled after five years for
less than half of their original value. The court in Blackstone said, "The factor of assumption or
nonassumption of outstanding liens in a controversy such as here presented ceases to be control-
ling when the reality of the conditions and circumstances attendant upon petitioner's purchase of
the property is appraised in light of the Crane case." Id at 804. (footnote omitted). See also
Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 296 (1951) (the full amount
of an unassumed mortgage was included in the taxpayer's unadjusted basis in an apartment build-
ing and in the amount realized upon foreclosure).
48. Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966). In Mayerson the court stated:
Taxpayers who are not personally liable for encumbrances on property should be al-
lowed depreciation deductions affording competitive equality with taxpayers who are
personally liable for encumbrances or taxpayers who own unencumbered property. The
effect of such a policy is to give the taxpayer an advance credit for the amount of the
mortgage. This appears to be reasonable since it can be assumed that a capital invest-
ment in the amount of the mortgage will eventually occur despite the absence of personal
liability.
Id at 352.
49. Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1.
50. Id
51. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See also Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47
T.C. 340 (1966).
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realized upon disposition of the property has been expanded.52
Whether there is a limitation on the amount of nonrecourse debt that is
includable in the amount realized is, however, a subject of continuing
debate spurred by references to the hypothetical described in Crane's
footnote 37.53
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE'S POSITION
In response to the effect of Crane's footnote 37 on tax conse-
quences on certain transfers, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued
Revenue Ruling 76-111. 54 The IRS did not follow the Supreme Court's
footnoted suggestion but instead it ruled that when a mortgagor trans-
fers property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage to the mortgagee in
satisfaction of the mortgage, the transaction constitutes a sale or ex-
change and the amount realized by the mortgagor will be an amount
equal to the outstanding principal balance of the mortgage, even if this
amount exceeds the fair market value of the property transferred. The
ruling clarified the IRS stance on the proper computation of amounts
realized upon disposition of property encumbered by nonrecourse
mortgages. The rationale of the ruling was that when the transaction is
viewed as a whole, the economic benefit to the transferor becomes read-
ily apparent. The economic benefit is enjoyed by the taxpayer upon
inclusion in his basis of the nonrecourse amount because the amount of
basis is then utilized in calculating allowable depreciation deductions.
55
Millar v. Commissioner
Millar v. Commissioner,56 decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in 1978, was, until Tufts v. Commissioner, the most signif-
icant decision following Crane.57 In Millar, the taxpayer executed non-
recourse notes secured solely by certain shares of stock. When the
stock was foreclosed because of nonpayment of the notes, the stock's
value was less than the value of the notes. Relying on the tax benefit
52. See Weiss, supra note 48 at 302-08.
53. See Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAxES 719 (1975).
54. Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214. See generally Morris, New Ruling Describes Deed
Transfer in Lieu of Foreclosure as "Sale or Exchange", 45 J. TAx. 224 (1976).
55. See Rollyson, Recent Cases and Rulings, 3 J. OF REAL EST. TAx. 495 (1976).
56. 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1979).
57. Prior to Millar, the issue of whether the full amount of a nonrecourse liability must be
included in the amount realized when the value of the encumbered property was less than the
amount of the liability was considered in Woodsam Assoc., Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357
(2d Cir. 1952), and Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320 (1947). Both of these cases
involved post-acquisition nonrecourse financing. "See also Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
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theory58 and the rationale of Crane, the Tax Court included the entire
value of the nonrecourse notes in the amount realized (received) by the
taxpayer upon cancellation of the notes.
59
The Third Circuit affirmed the holding of the Tax Court and re-
fused to find that footnote 37 created an exception to the principal
holding of Crane.60 The court noted that the taxpayers had taken size-
able deductions calculated on a basis that included nonrecourse indebt-
edness. The court explained that to allow such deductions and then to
limit the amount realized would be contrary to the "spirit and reason-
ing of Crane"61 because it was just such a taking of "double deduc-
tions" that Crane prohibited.62 Millar, following the reasoning and
holding of Crane, embodied the accepted view of the treatment of non-
recourse liability upon disposition of the property; the full amount of
such liability was to be included in the amount realized.
TuFTs v. COMMISSIONER
Facts of the Case
In August, 1970, taxpayers John and Mary Tufts became general
partners of Westwood Townhouses. 63 The partnership financed the
building of an apartment complex with a $1,851,500 nonrecourse
loan.64 Each partner included his allocable share of this liability in his
basis.65 Two years later, the principal amount of the loan remained
unchanged but the fair market value of the property had declined to
58. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44, for a discussion of the tax benefit theory.
59. Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656, 660 (1977), affdinpart, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1976).
60. 577 F.2d at 215. The court said:
[T]his Court declines to accept a literal reading of that footnote [footnote 371 as the
principal basis upon which this case should be decided.. . . First, it must be
remembered that the footnote in Crane was dictum. Furthermore, the footnote was but a
postulate or hypothetical observation with respect to a hypothetical set of facts not before
the Court and, indeed, involving a clearly different time and clearly different legal
circumstances.
Id See McGuire, On the Treatment of Realization of Gain on Recapturing Prior Deductiohs-Some
Thoughts on Millar, Tufts, and Footnote 37, 6 J. REAL EST. TAX. 132 (1979).
61. 577 F.2d at 215.
62. The Millar court quoted the following language of Crane: "The crux of this case, really,
is whether the law permits her to exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing
gain. We have already showed that, if it does, the taxpayer can enjoy a double deduction, in
effect, on the same loss of assets." 557 F.2d at 215, quoting Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. at
15-16 (1947).
63. For a complete statement of facts see the Tax Court opinion, 70 T.C. 756 (1978).
64. Id at 759.
65. Id There is no dispute as to the propriety of such inclusion or any adjustments made. A
partner's basis in his partnership interest includes his percentage share or partnership liabilities.
I.R.C. §§ 722, 752(a) (1976). Treas. Reg. §§ 1.722-1, 1.752-1(a)(1) (1960).
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$1,400,000.66 At this time each partner sold his partnership interest and
all of his right, title and interest in partnership properties to an unre-
lated third party who acquired the apartment complex subject to the
$1,851,500 liability. The buyer paid the partners only the expenses in-
curred as a result of the sale.
Each partner reported the sale of his partnership interest on his
federal income tax return and indicated that a loss had been suffered.
67
The taxpayers' position was that nonrecourse liabilities are includable
in the amount realized upon sale or exchange of a partnership interest
only to the extent of the fair market value of the property securing the
indebtedness. Therefore, the amount realized on the sale of their part-
nership interests was less than their cash basis and the partners suffered
a loss.
The Commissioner, however, included the full amount of the part-
nership nonrecourse liability in the amount realized on the sale. Since
the taxpayers' allocable share of the nonrecourse liability was $462,875
and their adjusted basis was $355,653,68 the Commissioner determined,
in a notice of deficiency, that the taxpayers had realized a gain on the
sale of their partnership interest in the amount of $107,222. The tax-
payers appealed to the Tax Court for resolution of the question of
whether the full amount of nonrecourse liability is includable in the
amount realized upon sale of a partnership interest.
The Tax Court Opinion
The issue before the Tax Court was the extent to which partner-
ship nonrecourse liability must be included in the amount realized
upon the sale or exchange of a partnership interest. The taxpayers' po-
sition was that nonrecourse liability is includable only to the extent of
the fair market value of the property.69 The first of several arguments
made in support of their contention was that footnote 37 of the Crane
70
66. 70 T.C. at 761. The decline in value of the apartment complex was due to adverse eco-
nomic conditions including substantial unemployment and overbuilding of apartments in the area
of the complex. Id at 760.
67. Id at 761. Although their returns indicated a loss, no deduction was claimed for such
loss. Taxpayers' petitions alleged that sales of their partnership interests in amounts equal to the
full amount of basis resulted in deductible long-term capital losses. The petitions claimed refunds
for overpayment of taxes, "in an amount to be determined by the Court." Id
68. Id at 762. In addition to his allocable share of the nonrecourse liability, Tufts' partner-
ship basis included contributed capital in the amount of $2,771. His basis was adjusted by the
following decreases: 1970 ordinary loss, $21,946; 1971 ordinary loss, $55,743; 1971 additional
depreciation, $96; 1972 ordinary loss, $32,208. Id.
69. Id at 763.
70. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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opinion implied Supreme Court approval of the outcome urged by the
taxpayers. The taxpayers contended that when the value of the prop-
erty is less than the amount of the liability there is no real economic
benefit to the taxpayer upon disposition, except to the extent of the fair
market value of the property. 7' They concluded, therefore, that the
economic benefit rationale underlying Crane and Millar does not ap-
ply. The taxpayers argued alternatively that the language of section
75272 dealing with the valuation of partnership interests limits the
amount realized on the sale of a partnership asset.73 The taxpayers
focused on subsection (c) and argued that the fair market value limita-
tion of that subsection applies to the sale of a partnership interest under
subsection (d). Thus, the amount realized on the sale of their partner-
ship interest includes a partnership nonrecourse liability only to the
extent of the fair market value of the partnership property subject to
the liability.
74
The Tax Court rejected the taxpayers' arguments. The court first
analyzed section 752 and the legislative history of that section and con-
cluded that the taxpayers' claim of a subsection (c) limitation on the
amount realized was erroneous. Section 752 is generally regarded as a
codification of the Crane doctrine for the purpose of determining the
basis of a partner's interest in a partnership. 75 Subsection (c) limits the
amount of liability that will be recognized 'Yor purposes of this sec-
lion .,76 Relying on the legislative history of section 752, the Tax Court
agreed with the Commissioner's application of the language of subsec-
tion (c) only to subsections (a) and (b) which deal with increases and
71. 70 T.C. at 763-64.
72. I.R.C. § 752 (1976) provides:
(a) INCREASE IN PARTNER'S LIABILITIES-Any increase in a partner's share of the
liabilities of a partnership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities by reason
of the assumption by such partner of partnership liabilities, shall be considered as a
contribution of money by such partner to the partnership.
(b) DECREASE IN PARTNER'S LIABILITIES-Any decrease in a partner's share of the
liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner's individual liabilities by reason
of the assumption by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as
a distribution of money to the partner by the partnership.
(C) LIABILITY TO WHICH PROPERTY IS SUBJECT-For purposes of this section, a lia-
bility to which property is subject shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such
property, be considered as a liability of the owner of the property.
(d) SALE OR EXCHANGE OF AN INTEREST-In the case of a sale or exchange of an
interest in a partnership, liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in
connection with the sale or exchange of property not associated with partnerships.
73. The taxpayers argued that the limitation set forth in subsection (c) applies to the sale of a
partnership interest under subsection (d). The Tax Court, however, agreed with the Commis-
sioner's assertion that the two subsections operate independently. 70 T.C. at 766.
74. Id.
75. Perry, supra note 24 at 542.
76. I.R.C. § 752(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
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decreases in a partner's liabilities. The court refused to apply the sub-
section (c) limitation to subsection (d), which deals with the sale or
exchange of a partnership interest, concluding that the legislative his-
tory of section 752 suggests a narrow applicability of the subsection (c)
limitation.77 The court noted that the committee report stated, with
respect to the sale or exchange of a partnership interest: "When a part-
nership interest is sold or exchanged, the general rule for the treatment
of the sale or exchange of property subject to liabilities will be
applied.7
8
Further, the court noted that it is unlikely that there is a fair mar-
ket value limitation on the amount realized, as the taxpayers suggested,
because that would mean that Congress legislated the result that Crane
prohibited. Since Crane ruled that the full amount of a nonrecourse
mortgage must be included in the amount realized, the legislation codi-
fying Crane must mandate a similar inclusion.7 9 Citing its own deci-
sion in Millar,80 the court explained that the rationale of the Crane
holding, the prevention of double deductions, is still valid. The tax-
payer in Crane took depreciation deductions computed on a basis
which included the amount of a nonrecourse loan, then argued against
the inclusion of such amount in the amount realized upon disposition
of the property. The Crane Court had refused to allow this pattern of
"double deductions." Faced with a similar fact situation in Tufts, the
Tax Court also refused to allow the taxpayer to exclude the amount of
the nonrecourse loan from the amount realized upon disposition of the
property. Since the taxpayer had enjoyed the benefit of depreciation
deductions calculated using a basis which included the nonrecourse
loan, the court included the nonrecourse loan in the amount realized
77. The committee reports state with respect to § 752:
Frequently, a partner will assume partnership liabilities or a partnership will assume
a partner's liabilities. In some cases this occurs as a result of a contribution of encum-
bered property by the partner to the partnership or as the result of a distribution of such
property by the partnership to the partner. The provisions of this section prescribe the
treatment for such transferred liabilities ....
The transfer of property subject to a liability by a partner to a partnership, or by the
partnership to a partner, shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such property, be
considered a transfer of the amount of the liability along with the property.
H.R. REPr. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A236 (1954); S. Rept. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 405
(1954).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(c) (1960).
78. H. REPr. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A236-237 (1954); S. Rept. 1622, (Pub. L. 591),
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1954).
79. 70 T.C. at 767-69.
80. 67 T.C. 656 (1977), aff'd in part, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1979).
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on the sale of the property.8 l
The court agreed with the Third Circuit's conclusion that footnote
37 was never intended to create an exception to the Crane holding.
Since the Supreme Court did not have before it a situation where the
fair market value was less than the mortgage amount, any comments
on such a fact pattern were dicta. The court concluded, therefore, that
the footnote stated only that if faced with a situation like the one in
Tufts, the result might differ from the Crane holding.
The Fifth Circuit Opinion
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court
and, relying on footnote 37 of Crane,82 ruled that the fair market value
at the time of disposition of property securing nonrecourse debt limits
the extent to which any relief of liability can be included in the amount
realized.83 The court focused on the two principal theories underlying
Crane8 4 and Millar 8 -- the tax benefit theory86 and the economic bene-
fit theory.87 With respect to the first theory, the court acknowledged
that the taxpayer in Crane had benefited financially from the deduc-
tions taken but denied that the tax benefit theory was the controlling
force behind the Crane decision.
88
Addressing the economic benefit theory, the court agreed with the
basic proposition that relief from a debt on which one is personally
liable is a benefit to the taxpayer. 89 Upon a close examination of the
underpinnings of the economic benefit theory, however, the court
found the theory "seriously flawed." 90 The basis for the economic ben-
efit theory is that "an owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than
that at which the property would sell, must and will treat the conditions
of the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations."' The
court recognized that for owners whose property is subject to a nonre-
course mortgage the truth of this statement is limited to situations
81. 70 T.C. at 770. The Tax Court stated, however, that they did not pass upon whether
nonrecourse liabilities in excess of the fair market value of the property securing such liabilities
are included in the basis of a partnership interest acquired by purchase. Id at 770 n.13.
82. See supra text accompanying note 40.
83. 651 F.2d 1058, 1063 (5th Cir. 1981).
84. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
85. 557 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1979).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
88. 651 F.2d at 1060.
89. Id at 1061.
90. Id at 1062. See Bittker, supra note 3, at 281-82.
91. 331 U.S. at 14.
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where the property owner wants to keep his property. Where he does
not want to keep the property he can transfer it to another person with-
out regard to payment of the mortgage or allow it to be foreclosed
upon. The court noted, however, that although the owner of property
subject to a nonrecourse mortgage has to pay the mortgage in order to
keep the property, the owner incurs no economic benefit upon transfer
of the property and the mortgage obligation to another because he has
no personal liability. The nonrecourse mortgagor cannot benefit from
relief of a debt for which he is not liable. Further, when the value of
the property is less than the amount of the nonrecourse liability, there
is little incentive for a debtor who is not personally liable to keep the
property and continue payment on the debt. The personally liable
mortgagor, on the other hand, has every reason to continue paying a
mortgage regardless of the value of the property, merely because he is
personally liable on the debt.
In view of this difference between recourse mortgagors and nonre-
course mortgagors, the Tufts court would not interpret "amount real-
ized" on the disposition of property to include the assumption of a
nonrecourse loan secured by that property. The Fifth Circuit held that
the fair market value of property secured by a nonrecourse mortgage
limits the extent to which relief of liability can be included in the
amount realized upon disposition of the property. 92
ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit's 1981 decision in Tufts v. Commissioner93 was
an unexpected reversal of the Tax Court. Until Tufts no court had
found merit in the conclusion characterized by the Supreme Court as
"obvious." 94
Although it criticized both the tax benefit theory and the economic
benefit theory, the Tufts court, to an extent, relied on these theories to
arrive at its holding. The Tufts court stated that the Commissioner's
reliance on the tax benefit theory was misplaced. 95 The court's inclu-
sion in the amount realized of a portion of the taxpayer's nonrecourse
liability is, however, evidence of its belief in the validity of the tax ben-
efit theory. It was never argued that nonrecourse liability should be
excluded from basis. Having accepted this inclusion, the court then
92. 651 F.2d at 1063.
93. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
94. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1947).
95. 651 F.2d at 1061.
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sought the counterbalancing effect that is at the heart of the tax benefit
theory. Because the taxpayers in Tufts benefited from the inclusion in
basis of the nonrecourse loan, inclusion of this amount in the amount
realized upon disposition achieved the balance the court was looking
for and preserved the symmetry of the Crane doctrine.
The Tufts court characterized the economic benefit theory, relied
upon in Crane, as "seriously flawed." 96 The Crane Court justified its
finding of economic benefit by comparing the recourse debtor and the
nonrecourse debtor. Finding their actions similar-they must pay or
lose the property-led the Court to conclude that their benefits upon
relief of their liabilities are identical. 97 The Tufts court recognized that
this analysis overstates the similarities between recourse and nonre-
course debtors. 98 The Crane Court was correct in stating that the own-
er of mortgaged property must maintain the payments in order to keep
the property whether the mortgage is recourse or nonrecourse. If the
owner no longer wishes to keep the property, however, the results of his
failure to pay the mortgage are entirely different. The nonrecourse
mortgagor can disregard the mortgage upon disposition of the property
with no further economic consequences. The owner who is personally
liable on the mortgage, however, is obligated to pay, even after he has
disposed of the property. Thus, the similarities between the recourse
and nonrecourse debtor noted by the Crane Court exist only when the
nonrecourse debtor wants to keep his property which is mortgaged at
an amount below the fair market value. The Tufts court was, therefore,
correct that in a situation where the fair market value of property is less
than the amount of the nonrecourse mortgage it secures, relief from the
mortgage results in no economic benefit. To argue otherwise is to dis-
regard economic reality.
The Third Circuit decided Millar99 under the tax benefit theory.
The taxpayer's sizeable deductions were followed by the court's inclu-
sion of the nonrecourse loan in the amount realized. The court justified
96. ld at 1062.
97. The Court stated:
[W]e are no more concerned with whether the mortgagor is, strictly speaking, a debtor on
the mortgage, than we are with whether the benefit to him is, strictly speaking, a receipt
of money or property. We are rather concerned with the reality that an owner of prop-
erty, mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the property will sell, must and will
treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If he
transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the
mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal debt in an equal amount had been as-
sumed by another.
331 U.S. at 14.
98. See Bittker, supra note 3, at 281-82.
99. 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1979).
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its inclusion as being within "the spirit and reasoning of Crane"'00 but
dismissed footnote 37 as dictum. l01 The Tufts court did not follow the
reasoning of Millar but, instead, founded its holding on footnote 37.
It could be argued that there is no solution to the "Crane di-
lemma"l 02-no reconciliation of the tax benefit and economic benefit
theories when property is subject to a nonrecourse mortgage greater
than the value of the property. If the amount of the mortgage is ex-
cluded from the "amount realized" upon disposition of the mortgaged
property, taxpayers will have obtained the benefit of large depreciation
deductions with little cash outlay and no recapture potential. The tax
benefits of large depreciation deductions would seem to mandate some
type of inclusion, but it is difficult to maintain that a taxpayer realizes
an economic benefit in the full amount of a nonrecourse mortgage
when that mortgage is assumed by another in that the taxpayer was
never personally liable on such debt.
The solution hes in utilizing the tax benefit theory to justify inclu-
sion while accepting a broader interpretation of the meaning of "eco-
nomic benefit." Where a transaction is viewed as a whole, it is easy to
recognize that the concept of "amount realized" need not be dependent
on the receipt of a benefit in the accepted meaning of the word. Thus,
the taxpayer's economic benefit is not "relief' from a mortgage for
which he was never personally liable. Rather, his economic benefit is
grounded in the total benefit enjoyed in the life of the investment, i.e.,
in the basis he has established and in the deductions he has taken.
Upon subsequent disposition of the property, the benefit is accounted
for by inclusion of the loan amount in the amount realized.
Another measure of the economic benefit received by the taxpayer
becomes readily apparent when the transaction is viewed as a whole.
Proceeds of a loan are not income. Receipt of the proceeds of a loan is
not a taxable event because the expectation of repayment exists. It
must be recognized, however, that a nonrecourse debtor has received
the cash equivalent of the amount of the nonrecourse loan, regardless
of the absence of the obligation to repay. The existence of the mort-
gage indicates the receipt of something of value. 0 3 The "something of
100. "A finding that the taxpayers did not realize gain as a result of this exchange after having
realized the full economic benefit of this transaction, would entitle them to the type of double
deductions of which the Supreme Court so clearly disapproved in Crane." 577 F.2d at 215.
101. id
102. Del Cotto, supra note 15 at 85. See also Comment, Non-Recourse Liabilities." A Tax Shel-
ter, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 57, 73-74 (1977).
103. Halpern, Footnote 37 and The Crane Case: The Problem that Never Really Was, 6 J. REAL
EST. TAX 197, 219 (1979).
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value" that was received was the use of a sum of money. When viewed
in this context, it is not difficult to understand that the taxpayer has
received an economic benefit in the full amount of the nonrecourse
loan and such amount should be recognized as subject to taxation. The
economic benefit occurred when the loan was received, only the timing
of taxation is delayed until the property is disposed of or the loan is
assumed by another.
The Tufts court suggests that the taxpayer be allowed to avoid tax-
ation forever on a portion of the amount of nonrecourse loans if, at the
time of disposition of the property securing the loan, the value of such
property is less than the amount of the loan. This would result in a
"no-lose" tax situation for taxpayers in such a situation. If, after taking
substantial deductions, the taxpayer's investment was not providing an
adequate return on capital, it could be disposed of, with no accounting
made for either the initial loan, or deductions taken in excess of equity.
The Tufts court, therefore, has bestowed a second advantage upon the
nonrecourse debtor who has already realized a great benefit merely
from the fact that his investment is nonrecourse.
It must be noted that Congress can, and often has, legislated an-
swers to questions like the ones presented here. The Tax Reform Act
of 1976, for example, limited the amount of deductions that can be
taken by an investor to the amount he actually has at risk, the amount
he has either contributed in cash or property, or for which he is person-
ally liable. Investment in real estate was not included in this major
reform. 04 It can be concluded that if Congress had intended to control
situations like Tufts, they would have done so. Determination of
amounts that are subject to taxation is essentially a policy considera-
tion. Whether investment in real estate will continue to receive
favorable treatment is a matter that should be addressed by
Congress. 105
The Tufts court must have anticipated the confusion which would
accompany its decision because it provided a lengthy footnote to "put
this case in its proper perspective."' 106 In it, the court focused on its
concern for the trend toward abuses of the tax law through various tax
shelter schemes. The court summed up the problem as "the taxpayer's
104. I.R.C. § 465 (1976).
105. The problem may be resolved by legislation. A provision that would reverse Tufts is
under consideration for submission to Congress. 54 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 3-4 (CCH) (1981).
Some commentators urge legislation to determine the correct resolution. See, e.g., Del Cotto,
supra note 15 at 103; Lurie, Morigagors With "Negative Equities" and "Negative Bases," 10 N.Y.
U. INST. FED. TAX 86, 103 (1952).
106. 651 F.2d at 1063-1064 n.9.
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ability to manipulate his basis and adjusted basis through the use of
nonrecourse financing."' 10 7  The court noted that the Millar decision
had, no doubt, been prompted by the court's concern that inflated bases
from nonrecourse financing will enable taxpayers to enjoy large tax de-
ductions with no real economic loss. A second concern is that it seems
unfair for a taxpayer to benefit from substantial deductions while plac-
ing little of his own capital at risk.
Although the Tufts court attempted to avoid the error it perceived
in the rationales of Crane and Millar, it presented no clear solution to
the taxpayer. Attaching the amount realized to the concept of "fair
market value," as Tufts did, does not indicate to the taxpayer what the
consequences of certain transactions will be and leaves him in doubt.
As stated earlier, the tax benefit theory would have justified inclusion
of the entire amount of the nonrecourse debt and would lend a cer-
tainty to the tax ramifications of transactions like Tufts. Given the fact
that Tufts is not in accord with other recent Tax Court decisions 10 8 and
is in direct conflict with the Third Circuit, it is not surprising that it is
on the Supreme Court docket for resolution of this important
question. 109
107. Id
108. See, e.g., Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980) (relief from a nonrecourse debt
was sufficient to support a finding of sale or exchange, even though the taxpayer had not benefited
from depreciation deductions while he held the property).
109. As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Com-
missioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983). Not unexpectedly, the Court reversed the court of
appeals and held that when a taxpayer sells or otherwise disposes of property encumbered by a
nonrecourse obligation exceeding the fair market value of the property, the taxpayer may be re-
quired to include in the amount realized the outstanding amount of the obligation.
The Court's decision is consistent with Crane v. Commissioner, which it read as having ap-
proved of the Commissioner's decision to treat a nonrecourse mortgage in this context as a true
loan. Rejecting the assertion that Crane is founded on a theory of economic benefit, the Court
noted specifically that the Commissioner had not characterized the Tufts transaction as cancella-
tion of indebtedness. (103 S. Ct. 1826 n.ll.) The Court also declined to employ a tax benefit
analysis which focuses on the taking of deductions and the subsequent recovery of those deduc-
tions if proven to be unwarranted. (103 S. Ct. 1826 n. 8.) Thus, the Court's rationale embraces
neither the economic benefit theory nor the tax benefit theory but, instead, rests upon the incurring
of an obligation to repay loan proceeds received.
The Court recognized that when a taxpayer receives a loan he incurs an obligation to repay
the loan. Because of this obligation the loan proceeds do not qualify as income to the taxpayer
and the taxpayer is entitled to include the amount of the loan in computing his basis in the prop-
erty. Because these calculations are made without regard to whether the loan is recourse or nonre-
course in nature the Commissioner is justified in including in the amount realized upon sale or
other disposition of the property the amount of the unpaid obligation, whether it is recourse or
nonrecourse. This symetrical treatment, requiring that a taxpayer account for the proceeds of
obligations he has received tax-free and has included in basis, balances such inclusion and the
original non-inclusion in income of the loan proceeds.
The Court rejected the contention that § 752(c) (26 U.S.C. § 752(c)) authorizes a limitation on
the amount realized on the sale or disposition of partnership property. Relying on the legislative
history of § 752, the Court concluded that the fair market value limitation of § 752(c) is directed to
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CONCLUSION
Despite the apparent fairness of the Fifth Circuit's reversal of the
Tax Court in Tufts, the court has not put forth a compelling argument
in support of its solution to the "Crane dilemma." The Fifth Circuit's
holding recognizes the essential difference between recourse and nonre-
course liability but ignores the crucial fact that even the nonrecourse
mortgagor has realized an economic benefit. The Tufts decision can be
characterized as a victory for taxpayers, but, because it is on such an
uncertain foundation, it surely will not stand.
transactions between a partner and his partnership under § 752(a) and (b) and is not applicable to
the sale or exchange of a partnership interest under § 752(d).
The decision of the Court is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory terms at issue and is
consistent with Crane. Although Tufts further restricts the benefits which accrued to taxpayers as
a result of Crane, the Court's decision rests upon a reasonable and logical foundation and is in
accord with recent acts of Congress. (See 103 S. Ct. 1826 n. 7.)

